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LEGISLATION TO CONTROL ANTHRACITE COAL MINING.-The
REGISTER has received a pamphlet on this subject by Judge R.

M. Benjamin, of Illinois. The author is of the opinion that the
paramount question at the next session of the Pennsylvania
Legislature will be the possibility of enacting under the Con-

stitution a law to control the contract between the mine owner
and the mine worker.
And it may very well be, that if a standard of wages is fixed
by the present Commission to investigate mi4ers' grievances,
and is found satisfactory, the Legislature will consider its
adoption as a permanent remedy for the evils arising from
recurring disagreements.
"The legislation of the state of Illinois establishing reasonable
maximum rates of charges for transportation on the railroads in
the state, suggests," says the author, "appropriate legislation for securing to the miners reasonable minimum prices
per ton for mining coal. In 1873 the Legislature of Illinois
created a Railroad and Warehouse Commission and gave it
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authority to make schedules of reasonable maximum rates
of charges for the transportation of passengers and freight.
The schedules are to be taken in all courts of the state as
prima facie evidence that the rates therein prescribed are reasonable. They are subject to revision from time to time as
often as circumstances may require, and penalties are prescribed for charging more than a reasonable rate. The character of the legislation is such that in a proceeding for a penalty
a railroad corporation may escape conviction if it is able to show
on a trial before a jury that its charges, although above those
prescribed in the schedule, are only reasonable. Such, in
brief, is the character of the legislation in Illinois to prevent
extortion by railroad corporations in their rates charged, or
contracts made for the transportation of passengers and freights.
It is confidently believed that legislation in Pennsylvania providing for a classification of the mines with reference to the
depth and thickness of the coal veins and any other 'differential' that. may be deemed important, and providing for
schedules prescribing what shall be taken in the courts as prima
facie reasonable ginimum prices per ton for mining coal and
fixing a suitable penalty against any corporation which may
make contracts with miners for less than reasonable prices, will
be held to be constitutional."
In objection to this proposition, it immediately suggests itself
that a control of contract is in conflict with the United States
Constitution, with its general spirit and more particularly with
the Fifth Amendment: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law;" and the Fourteenth Amendment: "No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States,, nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without. due process of law, nor deny
to any person the equal protection of the laws" (substantially
incorporated in the Constitution of Pennsylvania, Art. 1, § 1).
The object of this note is not an exhaustive discussion, but a
presentation of the -arguments and authorities of Judge Benjamin, and of the possible views and citations contra.
The author claims that "the right of the Legislature of Pennsylvania to enact such a law and thus restrict to a reasonable
extent the power of these corporations in making contracts
with their employes in mining coal, can be sustained in the
courts upon each and all of the following grounds:
"I. The business of mining coal is 'affected with a public interest."
"2. The business of mining coal in the anthracite region has
become a monopoly of a necessity of life."
". The state can restrict the liberty or freedom of contract so
as to prevent imposition and extortion."
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"4. The state can prescribe what contracts may be made
by the corporations of its own creation."
"5. 'The right to contract is not absolute but may be subjected to the restraints demanded by the safety and welfare of
the state.'"
In support of the first proposition, viz.: "the business of mining coal is affected with a public interest," the author cites the
case of Munn v. Illinois, 84 U. S. 113, 1873, in which the operation of grain warehouses was held to be such a business; and "the
limitation by legislative enactment of the rate of charge for
warehouse services was therefore held constitutional." In its
decision the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the
decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois and "reaffirmed the
doctrine announced by Lord Chief Justice Hale more than two
hundred years ago, that when private property is 'affected with
a public interest' it is subject to governmental control."
In the course of its decision the court says: "Jnder these.
powers (inherent in every sovereignty) the government regulates the conduct of its citizens one toward another, and themanner in which each shall use his own property, when such
regulation becomes necessary for the public good. In their
exercise it has been customary in England from time immemorial, and in this country from its first colonization, to regulate
ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers,
innkeepers, etc., and in so doing to fix a maximum of charge to
be made for services rendered, accommodations furnished and
articles sold. '
The Supreme Court followed this decision in Budd v. New
York, 143, U. S. 517, 1891, emphasizing the close relation
between the storage and the carriage of grain, and justifying
the right to control grain -elevators by the acknowledged right
of the state to control common carriers.
The author applies these authorities to the question under
discussion thus: "In each of these cases the liberty or freedom
of a private, natural person to make contracts was regulated
by the state on the ground that he was engaged in a business
affected with a public interest. If there is any business in this
country affected with a public interest, it is that of mining coal.
These corporations were created by the state .for the express
purpose of supplying the public with coal. With some legislation securing reasonable wages to the miners, the mines will be
steadily operated. Without such legislation :we have every reason to expect constantly recurring strikes and repetitions of
the present situation, which, in the languages of the president,
'has become literally intolerable."
In considering the value of thege cases as authorities, it
should be mentioned that none of the decisions were by an
undivided court. In the Illinois case Justices Strong and Field
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dissented, and in the case of Budd v. New York, supra, there
was a strong dissent by Brewer, Brown and Field, J. J. The tenor
of these dissenting opinions was that the freedom of private
contract could not be thus abridged, even though the business
under discussion was declared public by a constitutional provision (Constitution of Illinois, Art. 13, § 1,. 1870).
This points to a fundamental difference between a public and
a private business,--the one affects the public directly; the other
indirectly. The public itself is a party to the contract with the
innkeeper, the.wharfinger and the common carrier; the public
is affected but indirectly by the contract of hire between the
mine owner and the mine worker. In the cases cited above, it
is the fact that the contracts are with the public that gives the
right of legislative control. Although it may follow from this
that the mine owner can be controlled in some of his contracts,
-namely' those with the public,--it does not follow that he may
be controlled in all of his contracts--including those in which
the public is not a party.
In development of this phase of legislative power, Judge Benjamin points out that the business of mining coal is not only
"affected with a public interest,---it is a monopoly of a necessity
of life." And he presents this syllogism: "If the state can
regulate the prices at which such a public necessity as water or
fuel shall be sold by one who has a monopoly of the sale (S. V.
Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U. S. 347, 1883) it surely can
reasonably regulate the wages to be paid by the monopolistic coal
combine to its employes so as to secure the labor of duly qualified
miners and a steady supply of coal for the public."
This second proposition is clearly but a corollary of the first;
indeed, it merely omits the words: "business affected with a public interest" and supplies the more particular term, "monopoly."
Munn v. Illinois (supra) holds that the legislature may fix the
rates of a business affected with a public interest; Water Works
v. Schottler, cited here, holds that the Legislature may fix the
rates of a monopoly (and the court rests its decision on the
authority of Munn v. Illinois). The-auth6r's deduction that the
Legislature may also control wage contracts is therefore open to
the following objection in either case: that there is an unbridged
gulf between the control of a contract with the public (rates),
private contract (wages).
and
the control
Water
Works of
v. aSchottler
is moreover limited in the opinion
of the court: "The question here is not between buyer and
seller as to prices, but between the state and the corporation
as to what corporate privileges have been granted." When then
the court say it is within the power of the government to control
the prices at which a monopoly shall sell-water, the court's
reasoning might be added as context; because said monopoly
is a corporation controlled by the Legislature under the Constitution of the State of California.
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And this brings -us naturally to another phase of legislative power: "The state can prescribe what contracts may be made
by corporations of its own creation." Judge Benjamin thus
makes a full and direct statement of his contention and continues: "There are certain important distinctions between a
citizen or natural person and a corporation or artificial person.
It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court of the United
States that while a corporation is a person it is not a citizen
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Unlike the
citizen, a corporation has no natural or original rights or powers.
A corporation is an artificial person created by the law and endowed with only such capacity or powers as may be conferred
upon it by the act of incorporation. No lawyer has ever contended that the state in granting a special privilege or immunity
to a corporation has not a right to prescribe the conditions upon
which such privilege or immunity shall be enjoyed. . . . But
while corporations have no original rights or capacities and are
subject to legislative control it has been suggested that the proposed legislation would violate the miner's-the citizen's liberty
or freedom of contract. What is the natural person's original
liberty or freedom to contract? It is nothing more than the
liberty or freedom to contract with natural persons. And when
in addition to this liberty or freedom of the citizen, he acquires
the capacity or power to make contracts with a corporation, he,
as well as the corporation with whom he may contract, is subject
to the legislative restrictions accompanying the capacity or power
of the corporation. In the Rhode Island case (State v. Brown
Mfg. Co., 18 R. I. 16,'1892) holding that a law requiring corporations to pay the wages of their employes weekly is constitutional, the court further say: 'Corporations are artificial
bodies, and possess only such powers as are granted to them,
and natural persons dealing with them have no right to demand
that greater power should be granted to corporations in order
that they may make other contracts with such corporations than
the corporations are authorized to enter into.'"
. While granting that the charter of a corporation is, as it were,
a contract in which the legislature has reserved the right to
insert new terms, we suggest that legislative action is not thereby
entirely relieved from judicial restraint; the legislature cannot
insert what terms it pleases into said co)itract. We reach this
conclusion by the course of reasoning employed by the United
States Supreme Court, St. L. & S. F. R. B. v. Gill, 156 U.
S. 657, 1894, in considering an analogous question, viz: "Whether
if the power of the state to fix and regulate the passenger and
freight charges of railroad corporations has not been restricted
by contract, there can be found by judicial inquiry, a limit to
such power in the practical effect its exercise may have on the
earnings of the corporations. This court has declared in several
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cases that there is a remedy in the courts for relief against
legislation, establishing a tariff of rates which is so unreasonable
as to practically destroy the value of property of companies engaged in the carrying business, and that especially may the
courts of the United States treat such a question as a judicial
one, and hold such acts of legislation to be in conflict with the
Constitution as depriving the companies of their property without due process of law and as depriving them of the equal protection of the laws." The same court early stated the broad
reason for this position in Peik v. R. R., 94 U. S. 164, 1876:
"that the reservation of power to alter or repeal charters gave
the legislature the same power over the business and property of
corporations that it has over individuals; nothing more could
have been intended than to leave the stockholders in corporations in such a position that the legislature could place them
on the same footing with natural persons before the law, and
disable them from permanently evading the burdens on all others
engaged in similar vocations, by appealing to the letter of their
charter. Their object was not to open the door to oppression,
but to secure simple equality between citizens of the state,
whether working singly or in corporate associations."
And in considering the same question the court said in Reagan
v. Farmer'sLoan and Trust Co., 154 U. S. 399, 1893: "It is a
part of judicial duty to restrain anything which in the form of
a regulation of rates operates to deny to the owners of property
invested in the business of transportation that equal protection
which is the constitutional right of all owners. of other property.
It has always been a part of the judicial function to determine
whether the act of one party (whether that party be a single
individual, an organized body or the public as a whole), operates
to divest the other party of any rights of person or property.
The equal protection of the laws, which by the Fourteenth
Amendment no state can deny to the individual, forbids legislation in whatever form it may be enacted, by which the property
of one individual is without compensation wrested from him for
the benefit of another, or for the public. This is a government
of law, not a government of men, etc."
The Supreme Court of the United States decided the above
cases on a course of broad fundamental reasoning which admits
Judge Benjamin's entire contention on this point and finds
nevertheless a ground for the judicial restraint of the legislative
police power over corporations. The court admits the right of
the legislature to limit, alter, vary, or repeal a charter, but it
insists that the state's police power unlimited by contract, is
limited by reasonableness and necessity interpreted by the court
in the light of the Fourteenth Amendment. This well-settled
position is the- result of the court's conviction that the public
welfare demands for corporations the protection granted to "persons" by this provision of the Constitution, and that therefore
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the legislature stop short at the unreasonable regulation of
quasi-public contracts,--the taking of property without due
process of law. The court has often said that the undue regulation of freight and passenger rates (a quasi-public contract)
may amount to the taking of property without due compensation. We suggest that this precedent offers a basis for the
decision that the enforced payment of certain rates of wages (a
private contract) is under all circumstances an unreasonable
restraint,-that it is, in other words, an undue taking of private
property by the state within the prohibition of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Since the author proposes the control of corporations as a
solution of the strike problem, we venture an economic objection.
The establishment of control over corporations leaves uncontrolled private dealers, doing business individually and in the
various forms of unincorporated association. If a body of men
are materially restricted when incorporated and can make what
contracts they please when they deal privately, they will steadily
tend toward this economic result,--they will not do business
as a corporation.
It is natural therefore that Judge Benjamin should base his
final argument on the general police power of the state, not
alone over the corporate parties to the contract, but over
the inherent nature of the wage contract itself. He writes: "The
right to contract is not absolute, it is limited by the right of the
legislature to prevent imposition and extortion; . .
it is
subject to the restraints demanded by the safety of the state."
"In view of the long train of evils following the present
struggle between the mine operators and mine workers over the
price of labor, would not the proposed legislation come strictly
within the so-called, but never closely defined, police powers
of the state? Would not such legislation be as clearly within
the police powers as the laws prohibiting or restricting the sale
of intoxicating liquors or laws making illegal the contracts for
the purchase of 'future delivery' cotton or grain ?"
- "In Holden v. Hardy, 169 _U. S. 366, 1897, it was'held that a
statute of Utah providing that 'the period of employment of
workingmen in all underground mines or workings shall be
eight hours per day, except in cases of emergency, where life
or property are in imminent danger,' does not violate the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment by abridging the privileges or immunities of its citizens, or by depriving them of their
property, or by denying to them the equal protection of the
laws."
"In Booth v. Illinois, decided March 3, 1902. (Supreme
Court Reporter, Vol. XXII, p. 42), the Supreme Court of the
United States hold that the prohibition against options to buy
or sell grain or other commodities at a future time, which is
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made by the Illinois Criminal Code, Sec. 130, does not invade
the liberty granted to every citizen by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The court say:
'The argument is, that the statute directly forbids the citizen
from pursuing a calling which, in itself involves no element of
immorality, and therefore by such prohibition it invades his
liberty as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land. Does
this conclusion follow from the premises stated? We think not.
A calling may not in itself be immoral, and yet the tendency of
what is generally or ordinarily or often done in pursuing that
calling may be towards that which is admittedly immoral or
pernicious.'"
"In the language of the Supreme Court of Colorado, In re
Serip Bell, 23 Col. 507, 1897: 'No one doubts the authority or
questions the duty of the state to interfere with such force as
may be necessary to repress such -disturbances and maintain the
public peace and tranquillity; and as well may the state provide in advance against certain kinds of fraud and oppression
which lead to these outbreaks.'"
"And in Peel Splint Coal Co. v. State, 36 W. Va. 794, 1891,
the court say: 'It cannot be possible that the state has no police
power adequate to the protection of society against the recurrence of such disturbances, which threaten to shake civil order
to its very foundations.'"
The author is surely right when he says that the police power
is indefinite; that is shown peculiarly well by the fact that the
very jurisdictions whose general dicta he cites as authority,
have stopped far short of controlling the miner's contract in
particular cases.
In Colorado, Re House Bill, 39 Pac. 431, 1895, a bill entitled
"an act to regulate the weighing of coal in mines" was referred
to the Supreme Court for an opinion and was there pronounced
unconstitutional.
In West Virginia, State v. Goodwell, 33 W. Va. 179, 1889,
the court held unconstitutional an act prohibiting the payment
by miners of their employes in orders or other papers unless
redeemable in thirty days in lawful money of United States.
In Holden v. Hardy,supra, cited by the writer, the court limits
its decision thus: "We have no disposition to criticise the many
authorities which hold that state statutes restricting the hours
of labor are unconstitutional. It is sufficient to say of them that
they have no application to cases where the legislature had
adjudged that a limitation is necessary for the preservation of
health of the employes, and there are reasonable grounds for
believing that such determination is supported by the facts.
The question in each case is whether the legislature has adopted
the statute in exercise of a reasonable discretion, or whether its
action be a mere excuse for an unjust discrimination; or the
oppression and spoliation of a particular class."
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We see then, that thd general language of the courts, cited
by the author concerning the scope of the police power, is materially narrowed in those very same jurisdictions by actual decisions. Where the court has refused to uphold the regulation
of the weighing of coal (W. Va.), and the payment of miners
in store orders (Colo.), it could sustain a statute regulating
wages in any form, only by a complete reversal of decision.
But however strong these decisions might be, their authority
must always be limited in its application to legislation in Pennsylvania. For when, as in these cases, the court, in protecting
the Constitution considers whether the legislature has adopted
a statute in the use of reasonable discretion, it exercises, as it
were, a local political function. In other words, the reasonableness of a statute in Colorado does not prove its reasonableness
in Pennsylvania; that essential of its constitutionality can only
be judged in the light of the social and economic condition of
the particular community over which the statute extends.
This fact gives peculiar value to the decisions which have
already been made in Pennsylvania on the freedom of contract
under the police power. In Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa.
431, 1886, the "Store Order Act" prohibiting the payment of
miners in store orders was held unconstitutional on the ground
that "an attempt had been made by the legislature to do what
in this country cannot be done, that is, prevent persons who are
sui juris from making their own contracts."
The Company Store was again attacked by the "Terrekee
Store Order Act," passed by the last Legislature, in the form of
a heavy tax on store orders. The Dauphin County Court on
December 9, 1902, declared this act unconstitutional in the
following words: "The taxation imposed on defendant by said
act and charged against it in said settlement was intended to
and, if the act were sustained, would inflict a penalty on defendant for doing that which it has a legal and constitutional right
to do, and the act is, therefore, unconstitutional." Even if these
decisions were reversed, the court in recognizing the right to
prohibit store orders would still be far from sustaining the
Legislature's right to regulate wages.
Owing to the local character of the police power and to its
general indefiniteness, we believe that its application to the
freedom of the employment contract can best be shown by a
refereftce to particular cases in particular jurisdictions. We
present, therefore, a short list of decisions in which this phase
of the police power is substantially involved.
CALIFORNIA. Ex parte Kubach, 85 Cal. 274, 1890. Ordinance
of Los Angeles making it a misdemeanor for a contractor to
employ any person to work more than eight hours; held unconstitutional.
CoLoRAio. Re House Bill, 39 Pac. 431, 1895 (supra).
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ILLINOI.S. Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294, 1886. Statute
compelling weighing on a standard scale of coal hoisted from
the mine; unconstitutional.
Ramsey v. People, 142 IlD. 380, 1892. Statute recognizing
right of parties to contract for other modes of payment, but
providing for the weighing of coal where the miners were paid by
weight; unconstitutional.
Braceville Coal Co,. v. Peofte, 147 Ill. 66, 1893. Statute
compelling weekly payment of wages; unconstitutional.
Illinois Criminal Code, § 130. Prohibition against options to
buy or sell grain; constitutional.
INDiANA.
Hancock v. Yaden, 23 N. E. 253, 1890. Statute
requiring the payment of miners once in two weeks; unconstitutional.
MASSACHUSETTS.
COrn. v. Perry,155 Mass. 117, 1891. Statute prohibiting an employer of weavers from withholding wages
because of imperfections in the weaving; unconstitutional.
MARYLAxND.
Schaffer v. Min.Co., 55 Md. 74, 1880. Statute
compelling the payment of miners in legal tender of the United
States; constitutional.
Missouxx. State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 1893. Statute prohibiting the payment of wages in orders or checks, not negotiable
and redeemable at face value; unconstitutional.
NEBRA SKA. Low v. Bees Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127, 1894.
Statute providing that eight hours shall constitute a day's work,
and that employe shall receive extra pay for extra work; unconstitutional.
Orno. Wheeling Bridge Co. v. Crilmore, 8 Ohio C. 0. 858,
1894: Statute limiting work by employes of mines or railroads
to ten hours a day (1) and requiring eight hours rest after
-twenty-four hours' consecutive work (2) ; (1) unconstitutional;
(2) constitutional.
RHODE IsNu'D. State v. Brown Mfg. Co., 18 R. I. 16, 1892
(supra).
WEST VIlrGINIA. State v. Goodwell, 33 W. Va. 179, 1889.
Statute prohibiting payment in orders not redeemable within
thirty days in lawful money; unconstitutional.
The Constitutions of Louisiana and Wyoming expressly define
the legislative power over the employment contract.
LouIsAx.
Const. Art. 44. "No law shall be passed fixing
the price of manual labor."
WYomING.
Const. Art. 1, § 22. "The rights of labor shall
have just protection through laws calculated to secure to the
laborer proper rewards for his service, and to promote the industrial welfare of the state."
Since -the police power of the legislature over contractual
freedom depends so greatly on the conditions of the community,
and the economic status of its cqrporations, it cannot be said
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that decisions in different communities are squarely conflicting
or exactly analogous. Different statutory interpretations in the
same jurisdiction, however, offer an opportunity of observing
where the police power clashes with the Constitution. Especially when, as in Ohio, the same statute contains a twofold provision: first, for a ten-hour day; second, for an eight-hour rest
after twenty-four hours of labor. The first provision was overthrown, the second declared constitutional. Is there any difference between them. except one of degree? We think there is. A
statute compelling an eight hours' rest after a day and night's
work is plainly a health regulation. A statute, on the other
hand, which inserts in a contract the condition "ten hours"
before the word "day" and then provides a method of computing
extra pay for "extra hours" may incidentally affect the public
health, but it is aimed at an economic relation between employer
and employe; it breaks open the sealed contract' between them
and inserts the wages: a day's pay for ten hours' work. The
court disregarding as immaterial the incidental benefit to public health, looked to the true intention of the legislature, and
declared that statute unconstitutional. Just as in the oleomargarine cases, where the true object is to control or do away with
business competition, the court does not go behind the primary
economic effect contemplated by the legislature, and rules out as
immaterial all evidence to show whether or not substitutes for
butter are incidentally unhealthful. People v. Marx, 99 N. Y.
377, 1885.
And so with the author's proposition of controlling wages. We
have shown that its constitutionality depends upon whether the
legislature has exercised a reasonable discretion tested in the
light of the direct legislative object. Now -the declared object
of the proposed legislation is not to benefit the corporation; is
not to benefit the miner; it is to control the corporation, to control the protests of the miner, not for the benefit of both or
either of these parties to the contract, but "to secure to the
public a steady supply of coaL"
To this extent, we believe, the courts have never gone. In
Illinois where the statute forbidding contracts to buy or sell in
the future, has been upheld, the court has consistently overthrown repeated attempts at the regulation of wages. And this
points to the fundamental distinction. Of the right of the legislature to control directly public health and public morality there
can be little doubt; as where liquor or oleomargarine are forbidden because injurious to public health. Thus also, there is a
necessity for the regulation of private contracts that bear within
themselves the seeds of peculation and immorality; as for example the dealing in "futures" or in lottery tickets. We admit
also the legislative right to prevent imposition and fraud; the
prescribing of a set form of insurance policy; or the regulation
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of the charges of hackmen, etc.; or even the limitation (to $10)
of the fee of an attorney procuring a pension for his client (held
constitutional in Frisbie v. U. S., 157 U. S. 160, 1894).
These are all cases of legislation where the contract itself was
either inherently bad or it was necessary to protect the ignorance
or peculiar position of one contracting party against the fraud
or imposition of the other. But that is not the object of fixing
a standard of wages; and we have shown that it is by its true
object, that the statute stands or falls. The aim of the proposed
legislation is not to regulate a contract inherently bad, or to
protect the miner against the corporation,--it seeks to control
them both; to prevent the corporation from lowering the wages;
to prevent the miner from possibly demanding more than he
earns. In other words, it seeks to control both the rise and
fall in wages; to substitute a state standard, for the automatic
economic standard of wages. It seeks to repress their natural
economic differences, not for the benefit of either, but for the
advantage of another person; and we submit that the court has
never taken that step, whether that other person be an individual,
a set of individuals or even the public.
And finally we recall Judge Benjamin's argument in its completeness. His proposition is that a standard of the wages of
miners be prescribed by the legislature, to be taken by the court
as prima facie reasonable minimum wages, and further that a
suitable penalty be imposed on any corporation which may make
contracts with miners for less than "reasonable" prices per ton.
This involves. of course a detailed schedule with reference to the
depth and thickness of the coal veins, of what the corporation
ought to pay and of what the miner ought to get, throwing upon
the mine owner the burden of proving the reasonableness of
lower wages, and, we suppose, throwing upon the miner the
burden of proving the reasonableness of higher wages. This
legislation goes right to the heart of a private contract, in fact,
its very object is to make the contracts for both parties by settling
all their differences. The author argues that the coal companies
may be controlled in their contracts with their employes because
their business is affected with a public interest, more particularly,
because it is a monopoly, and more strongly still because it is a
monopoly in a corporate form.
But at this point the author is met by the objection that the
fiction, that a corporate association of persons is a creation of
the state, is not to be carried to the extent of depriving the corporation of that first right of a private person,-the economic
freedom of private contract. And therefore, to preclude this
argument, it is finally urged by Judge Benjamin that the police
power of the state extending over corporations and private persons alike, includes the right to regulate the contract between
the operator and the miner. In the last analysis of his reason-
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ing, then, we find that the author grounds his proposed legislation on the general power of the state to protect its citizens and
their property; and the whole structure of his argument for constitutionality stands or falls with this, the foundation upon
which it rests. It is true that the legislature has the right to
provide for the peace and welfare of the state, but it is also true
that for this very end, its power has a certain and permanent
limitation, for the police power of the state must yield when it.
comes in conflict with the Federal Constitution.

Walter Loewy.

